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An Attorney's Disclosure Under Rule 1.6 ofthe Maryland Rules of 
Professional Conduct Does Not Defeat a Client's Assertion of the 
Attorney-Client Privilege 
By: Julia J. Messick 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held an attorney's 
disclosure under Rule 1.6 of Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 
("MRPC") does not defeat a client's assertion of the attorney-client 
privilege. Newman v. State, 384 Md. 285, 306, 863 A.2d 321, 333 
(2004). In so holding, the Court concluded that an attorney who 
discloses information in order to prevent harm to others could not be 
compelled to testify as to that disclosure unless his or her client waives 
the attorney-client privilege. !d. 
In 1999, Elsa Newman ("Newman") and Arlen Slobodow 
("Slobodow"), parents of two children ("Lars" and "Herbie"), began 
divorce and custody proceedings. Stephen Friedman ("Friedman") 
represented Newman during the hearings. In spring 2001, at 
Friedman's request, Margery Landry ("Landry") attended meetings 
between Friedman and Newman to provide a "cool head in the room." 
!d. at 291, 863 A.2d at 324. During one meeting, Landry and Newman 
discussed harming one ofNewman's children and blaming Slobodow. 
On August 31,2001, Newman said to Friedman, "[y]ou know I 
don't have to kill both children. I only need to kill Lars because I can 
save Herbie, and then [Slobodow] will go to jail and get what he 
deserves because he is a criminal, and I can at least save Herbie." !d. 
Shortly thereafter, Friedman disclosed Newman's statement to Judge 
Scrivener, the head of the Montgomery County Circuit Court Family 
Division. Judge Scrivener informed Judge Ryan, the judge presiding 
over the custody trial, and Judge Ryan ordered Friedman's appearance 
as Newman's counsel stricken. 
On January 7, 2002, prior to the custody trial, Landry broke 
into Slobodow's home and, as he lay in his bed, shot Slobodow once 
in the leg. Slobodow pulled off Landry's mask and Landry fled the 
scene. Landry subsequently pled guilty to assault, burglary, reckless 
endangerment, use of a handgun in the commission of a felony, and 
obliterating the serial number on a gun. 
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On April 4, 2002, Newman pled not guilty to conspiracy to 
commit first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit assault in the 
first degree. At a pretrial hearing on June 28, 2002, the trial court 
determined Friedman could be compelled to testify because his 
disclosure under Rule 1.6 of the MRPC waived the attorney-client 
privilege. Newman objected to the court's decision to allow Friedman 
to testify at trial. During his testimony, Friedman disclosed both 
Newman's statement to him and to Landry regarding the harming of 
one ofNewman's children. 
On August 6, 2002, Newman was found guilty of conspiracy to 
commit first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, assault in 
the first degree, burglary in the first degree, and use of a handgun in 
the commission of a felony. The Circuit Court of Maryland for 
Montgomery County denied Newman's Motion for a New Trial. 
Subsequently, Newman appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, 
which upheld the trial court's conviction. The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland granted Newman's petition for writ of certiorari. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, relying on the Supreme 
Court of Massachusetts' reasoning in Purcell v. District Attorney for 
the Suffolk District, 676 N.E.2d 436, 440-41 (Mass. 1998), held that an 
attorney's disclosure to prevent future harm to others does not waive 
the attorney-client privilege. Newman, 384 Md. at 306, 863 A.2d at 
333. In its analysis, the Court of Appeals distinguished the attorney-
client privilege, which applies to client communications, from 
confidentiality of client information under Rule 1.6 of the MRPC, 
which applies to the attorney's general duty to protect his or her 
client's secrets. !d. at 302-03, 863 A.2d at 331. 
Moreover, the Court held that communications subject to the 
attorney-client privilege cannot be judicially compelled, whereas 
confidential information under Rule 1.6 of the MRPC may be 
judicially compelled. !d. at 304-05, 863 A.2d at 332. In the instant 
case, the Court held that because Newman's statement to Friedman 
was a "communication between the client and attorney" it was 
protected by the attorney-client privilege and therefore could not be 
judicially compelled. !d. at 306, 863 A.2d at 333. 
Further, the Court of Appeals determined Friedman's 
witnessing of Newman and Landry's conversation was protected by 
the attorney-client privilege. !d. at 308-09, 863 A.2d at 335. Quoting 
Rosati v. Kuzman, 660 A.2d 263, 266-67 (R.I. 1995), the Court held 
the attorney-client privilege extends to situations where "the client 
reasonably underst[ ands] the conference to be confidential 
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notwithstanding the presence of third parties." Newman, 384 Md. at 
307, 863 A.2d at 333. Thus, because Newman reasonably understood 
her meetings with Friedman and Landry to be confidential, her 
communications were protected by the attorney-client privilege. !d. at 
307, 863 A.2d at 334. 
Citing E.I. duPont Nemours & Co. v. Forma-Pack, Inc., 351 
Md. 396, 416, 718 A.2d 1129, 1139 (1998), the Court acknowledged 
that in most cases the presence of a third-party during an attorney-
client meeting will destroy the attorney-client privilege. Newman, 384 
Md. at 306, 863 A.2d at 333. However, relying on the analysis of the 
Supreme Court of Rhode Island, in Rosati, 660 A.2d 263, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland found Newman did not waive her attorney-client 
privilege by allowing Landry to join her meetings with Friedman. 
Newman, 384 Md. at 308, 863 A.2d at 334. The Court reasoned, citing 
Parler & Wobber v. Miles & Stockbridge, 359 Md. 671, 691, 756 A.2d 
526, 537 (2000), because Friedman, not Newman, suggested Landry 
be present during meetings, Newman's attorney-client privilege was 
never waived. Newman, 384 Md. at 308, 863 A.2d at 334. According 
to the Court of Appeals, the attorney-client privilege may not be 
waived by the attorney, but instead must be waived by the client. !d. 
at 308, 863 A.2d at 334. 
Additionally, the Court of Appeals explicitly adopted the 
crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 309, 863 
A.2d at 335. In so doing, the Court determined a client is prohibited 
from seeking "advice or aid in the furtherance of a crime or fraud" 
from his or her attorney. Id. Although Friedman testified that he felt 
as if he was being "sucked into their [Newman and Landry] plan," the 
Court found no evidence to demonstrate Newman intended to solicit 
Friedman's assistance. !d. at 312, 863 A.2d at 337. Thus, because 
Newman did not seek the "advice or assistance" of Friedman in her 
discussion of the crime, the crime-fraud exception did not apply. !d. at 
311-12, 863 A.2d at 336. 
In Newman v. State, the Court of Appeals not only determined 
the attorney-client privilege prevails over MRPC Rule 1.6 in relation 
to attorney testimony at trial, but also adopted and defined the crime-
fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. The Court 
demonstrated Maryland's dedication to protecting the attorney-client 
relationship and ensuring attorney-client communications remain 
candid and allow open disclosure. Moreover, the Court enabled 
attorneys to protect third parties from possible harm, while ensuring 
attorneys will not be forced to testify against their clients. 
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